Collapsible communism (as seen in 1991)

Communism has collapsed.

The Cold War is over.

Soviet union is disintegrating.

Marxism-leninism is dead.

Or at least everyone says so.

All these dramatic changes of such historic importance have apparently been sparked off by the famous “abortive coup in Moscow”.  The hardline plotters seem to have sealed the fate of the Cold War and demolished the communist party rule.  They’ve killed marxism-leninism doctrine and torn the soviet union apart in one short fit of brilliantly displayed inefficiency, stupidity, drunkenness, indecisiveness and so on and so forth.

“The Party’s over”, as British tabloids have used to put it for the last three years.  Yes, three years.  Well in advance of the coup, experts in these matters had pronounced their belief in the “collapse theory”.  In fact, communism has been buried by the media before: in every decade, under every leader, again and again.  Perhaps we should say that, like a collapsible toy, it was being dismantled and put together again.  Collapsible communism?

The Cold War, strictly speaking, has been over for much longer.  It ended over thirty years ago, when Malenkov, regarded at the time as Stalin’s successor, visited London.  Since then we have encountered one thaw, one détente, and one glasnost’, divided by short periods of realisation, on the Western part, of the true meaning of these exercises and a reluctant coming to terms with another soviet deception.  However, since Gorbachëv had announced merrily that together with Bush they “defeated the cold war”, suddenly, the soviet interpretation of modern history has become a norm.

That was the first pillar of new sovietology: rejoice, the war is over (even if only a cold war).

Communism, vaguely defined with reference to the theory and practice of command economy, collapsed even earlier, i.e. in late 1917.  In the Eighties, however, some Western journalists, appalled by living conditions in the ussr, decided that “communism proved itself ineffective in the management of economy”.  In fact, the quality of life used to change only from bad to worse under the soviet rule.  Communists were never willing or able to deliver goods to their people.  They undertook control over production and distribution of every single cabbage in the land not for the sake of the people but for the sake of controlling.  And has communism every showed itself ineffective in exercising control?  Thus, the civilian economy could and should be in a state of permanent collapse because “shortage” is a better instrument of control than “plenty”.  The command economy served well in the past as an instrument of sovietisation.  It serves even better now when the real economic chaos contributes to the “weak image” – the soviet union is so poor that it no longer poses any threat to anyone.  At the same time, the collapsed economy can be instrumental in weakening the West – we will return to this later.

The soviets are as keen to promote the “weak image” nowadays, as they were eager to create the image of a superpower at the time when they were trailing behind the West in technological race.  The gap in technology, however, was closed due to the efficiency and competitiveness of an alternative economy under communist control.  This capable structure has not collapsed so far.  It flourishes under the glasnost’ regime producing a wide range of arms with no match in Western arsenals.  Some soviet officials have indicated recently that the military complex will have to continue its production simply because closing down so many factories could start social unrest. [1] This suggestion has been me with sympathetic understanding on the Western side.

Meanwhile, the quality of MiG-29 fighter-aircraft, for instance, was met with disbelief by Western experts.  They were astonished even more than an unfortunate buyer of a Lada car is amazed with the quality of his vehicle.  The Lada is a product of the collapsed economy and is designed to amaze, while nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, tanks and helicopters are designed for more practical purposes.  Still, interestingly, the Western public is incapable of recognising these purposes.  Any possible appreciation of developments in the ussr has been subdued by constant astonishment.  “How is it possible,” a member of the public could have grumbled over The Daily Telegraph of August 26, 1991, “that, despite continued food shortages, they were capable of producing an advanced technology aircraft, which ‘has become a yardstick against which the other fighters are judged’?” [2] Well, exactly.  How is it possible?  My astonishment matches that of American aircraft manufacturers.  How is it possible to keep on talking about the collapse of communism?

It seems that, with a little help from their soviet friends, Western observers invented a new collapsible version of communism.  Confronted with a state capable of bringing its own people to the point of near starvation while using its vast resources to create advanced military equipment, they are quick to emphasize the weakness of this state in any field – but the military.  Central soviet authorities are said to be so weak that, although they can build ballistic missiles, they cannot feed their population or prevent the break up of the union.

The ussr is disintegrating, is it not?  This is the third cornerstone of the collapse theory.

The Baltics have been released.  Moldavia will soon be let free to join free Romania under president Iliescu (who had been Ceausescu’s right hand man).  The Ukraine will most probably be involved in a prolonged tug of war for its independence.  However, the circumstances of these extraordinary developments are worth scrutiny.  The strategic importance of the Baltic states has diminished, at least from Moscow’s point of view, since Koenigsberg was renamed Kaliningrad.  A similar argument could be put forward as far as the strategic relevance of once heavily fought over Bessarabia.  The Ukraine, though, is certainly relevant; nevertheless, it remains to be seen what harm Mr Kravchuk chooses to inflict on Moscow’s long term interests.  It seems likely that he will play “independent” on the lines of the late comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, with various “former” politburo members in the roles of “independent leaders”.

Hitherto, political gains from the ostensive disintegration exercise are enormous.  It boosts Western support for the “embattled Gorbi” and provides him with an easy explanation for inaction, whenever he needs it.  But what seems to be much more significant is the real disintegration of the Western alliance, with the fate of Israel being the most telling example. [3] Western European countries, despite the assurance to the contrary, seek reduction in their commitment to NATO, and in the United States the Pentagon is reported to plan to cut two army divisions, reduce the number of fighter wings from 36 to 20 and scrap three aircraft carrier groups. [4]

Why did the soviets wait for so long, then?  Why did they not play the pretend disintegration card earlier?  Why did they oppose the Baltics’ independence for so long, for instance?  It is a psychological truth that one’s appreciation of success is proportional to the resistance one encountered in the process of achieving it.  Secondly, such resistance gives credibility to the subsequent retreat as “committed under pressure”.  We are in the domain of PR, where perception is everything.

A faithful believer in the collapse theory would, I suppose, insist that, whatever the intentions of the soviet authorities, their influence has dramatically decreased.  The role of the Centre is going to be reduced to co-ordination; mere co-ordination of: foreign policy, economic restructuring and military command.  Meanwhile, the Kremlin will look after soviet nuclear capacity (in conformity with the non-proliferation treaties, of course) and will supervise economic co-operation between the republics.  No more.  Presidents Kravchuk, Nazarbayev, Yeltsin & co. can all be trusted, at least as much as presidents Havel, Iliescu, Wałęsa, and they will be allowed to manage their respective republics’ internal affairs in their own way.  In other words, we will see a new, more successful application of the “Sinatra’s doctrine” in place of the non-existent “Brezhnev’s doctrine”.

It is worth remembering that the West has always desired a peaceful disintegration of the ussr.  The understandable interest in all developments leading ostensibly to this end, ought to have been counterbalanced by scrupulous examination of the validity of a “dream-come-true” situation.  Otherwise, the overall picture was bound to be distorted by wishful thinking, even in the ideal world where there would be no communist deception.  Unfortunately, no one is willing to examine the disturbing information which could destroy the optimistic image.  Western analysts see what they wish to see whilst their soviet counterparts (without inverted quotes) provide them with details confirming their analyses.  The apparent disintegration of the ussr is tailor made for Western eyes.  It seems beneficial to the West and a disastrous loss to the soviets, because it was designed to seem so.  Alas, when it seems “too good to be true” it very rarely is true.

Once invented, “collapsible communism” was vigorously marketed in the West.  The “Cold War is over” slogan was designed for general public; “collapse of communism” for free marketeers”; “break up of the ussr” for military men; and for intellectuals, the celebrated funeral of marxism-leninism.

We are being told that, whatever the nature of the changes and regardless of whether they were initiated from above or not, something new and lively has emerged from the rubble of communism.  Soviet people liberated themselves from the clutches of a stale doctrine.  They speak their minds, they exercise their freedom.  Life flows again in the soviet blood system because marxism-leninism is dead.

Whilst it is undoubtedly true that the ussr was for many years tightly and relentlessly embraced by the doctrine, it would be foolish to suggest that Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin or Khrushchëv were all doctrinaires.  On the contrary, they were all extremely versatile and inventive.  Their flexible and creative approach to the matters of tactics became their hallmark and they all managed to successfully adapt to circumstances.  Their ideological background, contrary to popular perception, encouraged that attitude and in itself did not constitute a sacrosanct area.  Lenin’s nep amounted to no less that an ideological U-turn; so was Stalin’s thesis of “socialism in one country”, so was Khrushchëv’s “de-stalinisation”.  Despite the changes they implemented, they were all attached to one principle of marxism-leninism: their long term global strategic aim remained the same: world domination.

Even the state they created they regarded as merely an instrument in the pursuit of absolute power.  All internal developments were viewed and evaluated in an external context, in relation to the current situation on the international chess-board.  The total control they enjoyed over their peoples enabled them to shape the domestic affairs so as to maximise the strategic gains.  It can be said that marxism-leninism is a doctrine of foreign affairs.

Mikhail Gorbachëv is a worthy successor to the Fathers and Doctors of communism.  He is certainly a true leninist; he remains faithful to Lenin’s aims and still draws lessons from Lenin’s tactics.  He devised glasnost’ and perestroika to launch a new offensive onto the West (known as “new political thinking”).  His short term aim was the integration of the soviet union into the world economy.  The long term objective remained unchanged.  His policy of developing close economic and cultural ties with outside world is nothing new in the soviet strategy.  Large scale investments in the ussr will not change much in the collapsed soviet economy but will certainly change the world economy beyond recognition.  The very idea of merging two such heterogeneous entities would be equal to, say, integrating Atlantic Ocean into the continental Europe: first you bring your sea defences down…  The consequences must be disastrous, and this is precisely why they are interesting for Gorbachëv.  The ruins of the integrated world economy will provide a fertile ground for collapsible communism to re-emerge.  Aided by its potent “alternative economy”, capable of delivering hi-tech goods regardless of the state of affairs around it, soviet leaders will find themselves in a desirable position to dictate.  And that is the long term prospect.

Meanwhile, we will be treated to more changes of names, more salvation councils being set up, more statues being brought down.  People’s energy gets harmlessly channelled by street name changes.  Expectations are raised by new committees, preventing people from taking matters into their own hands.  Social wrath is quietly defused by the unforgettable sight of statues being removed and humiliated.  Even Stalin’s figure has recently been dumped face down in a Moscow park, although it was nowhere to be seen before. [5]

And yet, to suggest that someone dumps statues at night in parks to placate and accommodate public anger is to be accused of “conspiratorial flight of fancy”.  The idea that authorities could set up bogus committees to conceal real issues and avoid real change is considered “barmy”.

Lenin always maintained that worldwide revolution was an aim justifying the use of any means.  Tactical retreats or great deception plans, if they are to be successfully implemented, demand a high degree of secrecy and co-ordination.  Eventual success depends largely – but not exclusively – on this secrecy.  Is it in fact a conspiracy?  Or rather a skilful political manipulation aimed at achieving strategic gains?  It seems strange to me that a political commentator reflecting upon the way in which Mr Heseltine had tricked Mr Major into abandoning the community charge is a “political analyst”, while someone presenting soviet deception game must be a “peddler of conspiracy theories”.  Never mind.  Those who pointed out the use of deception in soviet startegy were forever being rebuffed and ridiculed by sovietologists (with soviet blessing), who preferred to analyse the esoteric language of soviet publications in endless pursuit of alleged factional divisions and power struggles.  These days they occasionally get some stick from the press.

Jonathan Steele wrote in The Guardian:

Russians love conspiracy theories, and a surprising number of people here are convinced the putsch was all a fake.  Whatever else 74 years of bolshevism have done, they have instilled a wide-spread belief that politics are not the shambles that they seem, but a complicated script in which one or two masterminds are able to manipulate millions. [6]

The key to this passage is provided by the ominous words “politics are not the shambles that they seem”.  Certainly, politics is a game of conflicting interests, it is therefore, appropriate to call it “shambles”.  The realm of politics is invariably dominated by intrigues, be it in a parliamentary democracy or in an absolute monarchy.  One intrigue counterbalanced by another and then double-crossed by yet another – makes it all a shambles.  But the same cannot reasonably be said by totalitarian states.  Unlike the merely authoritarian ones, they tend to use the total control they exercise over their populations to pursue long term objectives.  Thus, politics in Russia are not shambles at all.

The communist movement from its origins in the Communist Manifesto was always dedicated to deception.  Marx and Engels sought to exploit “the shambles of politics” by siding with specific political parties for short term gains.  They advised their followers to support every destabilising force, whilst never losing the sight of the revolutionary goal.  Lenin put that theory into practice.  Manoeuvring from war communism to nep, he relentlessly pursued the same objective.  In the Thirties, his successor, despite his obvious weakness, created an image of a superpower to fend off potential aggressors and to give credit to his global aspirations.  During the war, Stalin introduced a series of façade changes to persuade his Western allies that his regime was evolving towards normal national government.  His success, though, has to be attributed to the will on the part of Western leaders to see those changes as genuine, rather than to the skill of his manoeuvres.

Churchill indirectly acknowledged that he had been deceived, in his famous Fulton speech where he coined the “Iron Curtain” phrase.  Not a great many duped leaders ever manage to do quite that much but the unfortunate pattern that emerged from this speech was to henceforth recognise solely past communist deceptions.  The ongoing provocation seems to be impenetrable whilst it is being perpetrated.  Even though the elements of the wider plan are being constantly uncovered, the process of connecting the dots eludes Western observers for one reason only: to match them up would amount to giving credit to a conspiracy theory.

Debating the conspiratorial version of history is not my topic here.  “Masonic plots” or “international Jewry’s manipulations” are not worth discussing.  It would not be appropriate though, to discard a priori any attempt to point at secret deals as a motor behind certain developments.  Is Machiavelli’s Prince a work of political fiction?  Or is history a stage increasingly prone to manipulation?  The modern world, with millions of people everywhere glued to television screens, invites such actions much more than the 16^th century Italy did.

Nonetheless, those who look down with contempt on peddlers of conspiracy theories are ready to admit the shadowy nature of politics; this, in fact, is their principal argument against a “complicated script” of long term deception plan (as we saw articulated by Jonathan Steele).  Conspiracy seems to them too simple (if not simple minded) an explanation.  My belief is that they can maintain such a stance only because of their fundamental misapprehension of communism.

Soviet union and its derivatives (mainly in Eastern Europe but also on every other continent) constitute a class of their own.  A conventional national state is committed to welfare of, at least, a small part of its citizens.  The wellbeing of one’s own subjects was the usual motivation behind most invasions and peace treaties in history.  Not so in the ussr.  The popular analysis of soviet society pitches the privileged class (nomenklatura) against the deprived masses but it fails to grasp that most members of the privileged class would prefer to be deprived as long as it was somewhere else.  Soviet invasions and peace treaties have only ideological justification.  Soviet territorial expansion had nothing to do with conventional “imperialism” or “colonialism” (the quality of life in Prague or Warsaw remained higher than in Moscow throughout the allegedly colonial rule).  But once all structures of the state are subservient to an ideological objective, one can embark on long term operations.  Hence only in the soviet world is it possible to successfully conduct long term deceptions because a natural balance between action and counter-action, as motivated by various natural interests in free societies, does not exist there.

The infamous “abortive coup in Moscow” was the most recent example of this process.  And an amazing coup it was.

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The above text was written in 1991 for the Soviet Analyst.  The late Christopher Story did not like my implied criticism of Winston Churchill and decided to publish only the second part, devoted to the Moscow coup.

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1. The Times, 8 October 1991: “…factories would make obsolete T72 tanks for 10 to 20 years, even if it meant driving them straight to the scrap yard.”
2. This amazing report by John Lake, was printed under the headline “Nato’s best fighter is made in Russia”.
3. Although much testifies to the contrary, it was decided once and for all that “Moscow had abandoned her Arab allies”. This bizarre misapprehension proved to be enough for Washington to truly forsake the only bastion of democracy in the Middle East and push Israel to the edge of the abyss.  When the obsolete scud missiles proved such an effective weapon of terror in Iraq’s hands, Syrian regime immediately bought an improved version of scuds from North Korea.  Secretary Baker, however, insists on Israel making ground in the so called “peace process”.  For more details of soviet military help for Iraq during the Gulf War, see Christopher Story, “Winning the war without fighting”, Midstream, April 1991.
4. The Guardian, 25 November 1991
5. The Times, 10 September 1991
6. The Guardian, 4 November 1991