Same old nationalism
Jeff Nyquist is not your typical American journalist. He knows Golitsyn, he’s alert to the dangers of a communist plot on a global scale, and to cap it all, he firmly believes that Eastern European revolutions of 1989-1991 were part of a long term strategy, conceived long ago under Khrushchev and Mao. Thanks to such views, Nyquist’s writing appears clear, uncompromising, original and fascinating to the point where it must be rewarding to engage him in a debate on the complexities of the modern world. And bearing in mind the transformation, which has recently occurred in his political thinking, there is indeed a lot to quarrel about.
In recent times, Nyquist seems to have accepted almost as irrefutable dogma, that Saakashvili in Georgia and Yushchenko in Ukraine are a source of hope for liberation of the Eastern part of Europe; that the appearance of the two heroes on the political stage proves the soviet long term strategy is in tatters and, who knows, perhaps in time will prove to be ephemeral. This new stance, brimming with hope, has become a kind of counterbalance to Nyquist’s personal pessimism regarding both American and global political developments. The surprising conclusion of his recent divagations seems to be that the two leaders freed from bolshevik yoke somehow compensate the American decline.
Is this really so surprising? After the initial confusion it’s time for reflection. Is the change in Nyquist’s views so radical? Let’s look at the first paragraph of one of his recent articles, The Question of Discernment, where Nyquist states among others:
The former Warsaw Pact countries have joined NATO, and so have three former Soviet republics. If Moscow doesn’t like a political outcome in Eastern Europe, Russian tanks can no longer be called upon to intervene.
Is this the first breach in the structure of soviet long term strategy? Not necessarily. Author suggests something rather more serious. He says clearly “…joined NATO.” Who did? “Countries”!… What “countries”? “Of the former Warsaw Pact.” Nyquist says it all without a shadow of irony, with one and only intention of communicating an obvious fact. The first consequence of the fall of soviet empire (real or fictional?) was the emergence on the international scene of new “states” (I venture to guess that these are “sovereign states”). Then these “states” freely left the Warsaw Pact only to “join NATO”. In other words, they have switched alliances. And what has Moscow to say about that? Moscow appears to be powerless. They cannot even send in the tanks… This helplessness has two reasons: firstly, those “states” are no longer under Moscow’s thumb (they are brotherly no more); and secondly, the tanks appear to have switched allegiance too, they are now Russian!
Perhaps we ought to ask Jeff Nyquist how he understands the “long term soviet strategy”, “disintegration of soviet empire”, “fall of communism”? We have to ask him because it seems now that he interprets these provocative and deceiving phrases more or less literally. It now appears that he has accepted the “structural changes” in soviet bloc as real, or to use a more concrete language, polish people’s republic has become Poland, people’s hungary – free Hungary, even the ukrainian soviet socialist republic has become the Free Ukraine.
Let’s stop for a moment. Let’s remind ourselves of the words of the leading bolsheviks in time of perestroika; people who, as Nyquist rightly points out somewhere, often speak to us quite openly. Let’s listen to the pronouncements of one Boris Yeltsin on the 28th Congress of CPSU in July 1990:
The Party apparatus will decide on a fundamental restructuring of the Party. In a democratic state, a changeover to a multiparty system is inevitable. Various political parties are gradually being formed in our country. At the same time, a fundamental renewal of the CPSU in inevitable. First. It is necessary to organisationally codify all the platforms that exist in the CPSU and to give every Communist time for political self-determination. I am sure that most rank-and-file Communists link the Party’s future with the democratic wing. Second. To change the name of the Party. It should be a party of democratic socialism. The Party should divest itself of all state functions. A parliamentary-type Party will emerge. Only this type of Party… will be able to be a leading Party and to win elections for one or another of its fractions.
Yeltsin’s words were backed up by the glorious leader of the perestroika, Gorbachev, who in precise terms described the question of “structural changes”:
Above all, [we confirm] the determination of the CPSU to… enhance its vanguard role in society and to make an even greater contribution to achieving the goals of our revolutionary restructuring.
Allow me to formulate three conditions necessary for the Party to fully demonstrate its viability and actually attain its vanguard potential. We must do everything to firmly establish in the CPSU the power of the Party masses based on all-encompassing democracy, comradeship, openness, glasnost and criticism. […] The Central Committee and I as General Secretary will do all we can to help the Republic Communist Parties gain their new independent status as soon as possible, a status that will lead not to a fragmentation of Communists and nations but to a new international unity of the CPSU on a common ideological basis.
On the face of it, confessions of bolshevik classics of perestroika do not leave much room for interpretation or to wishful thinking. In practice, however, it is not necessarily so. Nyquist without a doubt knows the above quotations, but the bolshevik credo formulated during the last party congress before the “disintegration” of the soviet union, does not stop him from proposing most astonishing theses: that “independent Ukraine” is surrounded by a chain of hostile “Russian” forces (by the way, 500 km long border with “Poland” could hardly be described as “a small and vulnerable corridor”); that “Russia” has “high-placed agents in the Ukrainian security system”; or that Yushchenko (no less than a president of “free Ukraine”, according to Nyquist) was brave in talking about the Great Famine in the Ukraine in 1930s. Although he does not “think the Orange Revolution secured genuine independence for Ukraine” (it’s all very confusing sometimes), Nyquist maintains that there are real political forces pressing for such independence.
Why is it so? Why, despite his clear knowledge of the aims of perestroika and the long term strategy, does Nyquist prefer to listen to fairy tales from inebriated Yeltsin about “a general who was like the generals I read about in books when I was young”? There seems to be one possible answer – it is nationalism. The same old nationalism, which in open conflict with bolshevism led serious politicians, like Piłsudski or Churchill to the abyss; which assisted bolsheviks in year 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920, 1922, 1939, 1941 or 1945 and still remains one of the motors of communist policy both on the global scale and in localised conflicts.
Nyquist is a proud nationalist. He spoke about it in one of his recent comments with his usual lucidity:
I am told that nationalism and anti-Communism are inconsistent, that I am not really an anti-Communist, is highly offensive to me personally. Also, I am an American. The U.S. is my nation, and without my nation I am either dead or in exile. If I am not for my nation, what am I? Here is my nationalism, mock it or degrade it as you will.
Isn’t he most obviously right? What can be wrong with national identity, with feeling of unity with one’s compatriots, with pride in their achievements? How many of us are free from such “instincts”? Myself, I sometimes support sportsmen with White Eagle on their shirts, regardless of the fact that they represent a state totally alien to me.
The essence of the problem is as always hidden in the detail. There is a difference between patriotic pride and national egoism; between natural bonds with our compatriots and a belief that the cause of one’s own nation should take precedence over the individual interest or the benefits of other nations; in short, between patriotism and nationalistic blindness. As a self-confessed nationalist, and at the same time an anticommunist, Jeff Nyquist is uniquely placed to discuss this problem.
Perhaps he would deign to look at other crucial questions. What bearing did American national egoism have on the fate of nations and the world in the 20th Century? Did standing by American interests have any impact on the fortunes of Hungarian fighters in 1956; Cuban counterrevolutionaries in the Bay of Pigs; Vietnamese anticommunists in 1975; or the faithful American allies from the valiant nation of the Hmong, who 2010 AD are still hiding in the Laotian jungle? Is it not nationalism, which is responsible for the treatment of apparatchiks such as Yushchenko and Saakashvili, as non-bolsheviks, indeed, as patriots, forgetting that in the last 90 years, the “states” they represent were not victims of Russian imperialism but well oiled parts of a bolshevik political machinery; forgetting that the sovietised population of these countries, just as in Poland or Czech Republic, or Bulgaria, neither has a chance, nor is it inclined to build an open society?
We would need to consider these questions carefully, before we can mull over the chances of anticommunism locked within hopelessly contradictory national egoisms.
—————————————————
During a long exchange of views regarding some aspects of nationalism and anticommunism, conducted on our website, Jeff Nyquist felt insulted by some of the arguments used, he saw them as “highly offensive to him personally”. I like his openness and his plain speaking because there is nothing worse than resentment hidden behind polite words. Jeff wrote clearly what he did not like. Thanks to that I can reassure him that no one in The Underground has ever questioned his anticommunist credentials. I can also declare that we are not in the habit of getting into debates with people who do not deserve our respect.
Open political discussions are often emotional. Sometimes, mutual irritation causes participants not to listen to arguments with attention they deserve. These uncomfortable aspects of taking part in debate belong to the very nature of discussion and are difficult to avoid. Nevertheless, the importance of a serious dialogue, and it was a serious exchange of views with Jeff Nyquist, ought to outweigh all discomforts. On that basis, but also based on my good knowledge of both main contributors to the debate, I am convinced that no side effects will divert our attention from the heart of the matter nor will prevent us from reaching interesting conclusions.