The Great Provocation
To describe the grand machinations of a long term strategic plan, such as the one deployed by the soviets, the English or American writers usually used the term deception, i.e. a piece of trickery, as in magic, which leaves the observer cheated, mistaken or under false impression. This is indeed a good description of the state of mind Western politicians find themselves in when confronted by soviet plots. However, in Polish tradition (and in so far as I’m aware in many other languages) such schemes are described by a different term: provocation. There was a very good reason why Yale University decided to publish Józef Mackiewicz’s seminal work under the title The Triumph of Provocation rather than “triumph of deception”.
According to the Oxford Dictionary, the word provocation has many meanings but we will leave the obscure ecclesiastical court usage aside. Provocation could mean as much as “a challenge to fight” but also “the action or an act of provoking someone; an incitement, a stimulus to anger, resentment or irritation”; to provoke is as much as “to incite or urge into some act or to do something; stimulate to action”.
Whilst it is true to say that soviet plans are always aiming to deceive, to cheat, to create a false impression, the word provocation describes a more important aspect of this phenomenon, at least in my opinion. Namely, that it is not enough for the soviet strategists to deceive, to dupe their foes; the actual aim of the operation is to provoke the opponents to action, into doing something, seemingly of their own free will, which would bring about their own destruction.
Józef Mackiewicz was not the first to use the term, although he made it his own. What is provocation? Let me quote extensively from Mackiewicz since, demonstrably, he is not widely known:
“The encyclopaedia definition states: ‘An insidious inducement to action, which may bring about detrimental results to the provoked person and to third parties.’ Were we to limit ourselves to this definition only, we would discern elements characteristic of a typical provocation in the activities of the Communist ‘Association for the Development of Contacts with Fellow-Countrymen Abroad,’ whose task is to convince émigrés that they should cooperate in all matters which are in the common ‘interests of the country and the nation’ while abroad. (1) These activities are ‘insidious,’ since the slogan ‘interests of the country and the nation’ is a screen for the interests of international Communism. (2) They have ‘detrimental results to the provoked person,’ since if we understand the word ‘person’ to involve the whole nation, it is directly encouraged to contribute to the consolidation of its own slavery. (3) They are also detrimental ‘to third parties,’ since collaboration with international Communism constitutes a potential danger for other nations.
The term provocation in its common usage, however, has broader implications. Even if we go back to such an anachronistic model of individual provocation as the Azef affair, we find within it elements of ‘double-dealing’ which are so difficult to distinguish in any kind of provocation. Were the assassinations of Plehve and Grand Duke Sergei, organized by Azef, in the interests of the Socialist Revolutionary Party terrorists? Definitely. That is why, on the one hand, General Gerasimov, a departmental chief of the Okhrana, shouted at Azef in a moment of bad humour: ‘From this moment on, no more double-crossing!’ On the other hand, however, after Azef was unmasked by Burtsev, the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionaries ‘let him slip away,’ as Lopatin expressed it. And it was rumoured that the Central Committee had known even earlier about his contacts with the police… A provocation, therefore, is always to some degree a double game. Communist provocations invariably contain more or less concealed elements of poputnichestvo, that is, of an apparent compromise. This compromise allows for diverse interpretations, and consequently one does not know for sure where the apparent interests of the target of the provocation end and where the interests of the provocateur begin. The provocation operation is therefore arranged in such a way that the quantitative weight of the benefits to the planners are greater than the quantitative weight of the compromises on minor matters made to the target.
The ‘Gomułka’ type of provocation as applied to Polish émigré circles is in complete accordance with the instructions of the already mentioned diversionary association. This latter does not demand that the émigrés return home or abandon their ideological positions: it demands only that they support the supposed interests of the ‘homeland’ in the most important matters; that is, the interests of international Communism, which are concealed beneath this slogan.”
The last paragraph of the above citation leads me nicely to my analogy. I believe that the alleged collapse of the soviet union never happened, that “communism faked its own death”. It follows, therefore, that what happens inside the former communist bloc must be viewed with some suspicion. This does not mean to say that all people living there are secret agents of the kgb, since that would be as absurd, as it is impossible. It does, however, mean that the institutions of state cannot be somehow magically freed from the essential influence of soviet structures without the whole provocation disintegrating, simply because, were there any danger of these institutions breaking free, the soviet structures would intervene. We had numerous examples of that; the parliamentary coup in Poland in June 1992 is one of many.
Having said that, Ukrainian orange revolution does not look to me as an example of the institutions breaking free (I think even Nyquist agrees with that) nor the soviet intervention in Georgia looks much like the evil empire striking back. Let’s focus on the latter for a moment. Jeff Nyquist wrote:
“The decisive argument for the authenticity of Saakashvili’s revolution in Georgia is found in the Russian military strike of August 2008: The Kremlin displayed its evil intentions and then was forced to abandon its military offensive by Western economic pressure. It is hard to imagine a more pathetic outcome, from a strategic point of view. The deception policy of 1989-91 was seriously damaged. There is nothing here, whatsoever, that could serve Moscow’s purpose. The West applied its economic weapon and forced Russia to retreat. If this is the work of a KGB agent sitting in Tbilisi, then the KGB has become as stupid as the CIA, and it’s strategy has become nonsense.”
That is rather bizarre coming from an avowed reader of Golitsyn. So, according to Golitsyn, was soviet military strike on Czechoslovakia in August 1968 a “decisive argument for the authenticity” of Prague spring?! Then, as now, Kremlin displayed its evil intentions and was “their deception policy damaged” as a result?! Surely not according to Golitsyn. I agree with Golitsyn, as it happens, so I can’t see any damage being done at all. The soviet strategy has become nonsense? Which part exactly, please? Either I don’t understand what the soviet strategy is or Nyquist has lost me completely.
Nyquist urges me to “concede that genuine revolutions in Georgia or Ukraine are possible”. First and foremost, I have never stated anywhere that they were impossible, so I have nothing to concede however much I’d love to please Jeff Nyquist. Nevertheless, I can’t imagine that I will be easily convinced by a revolution from above directed by people whom Nyquist describes as “guilty by association”. Again, I read Nyquist in astonishment:
“It is probable, indeed, that Saakashvili was initially used by Georgian dictator Eduard Shevardnadze as a cast member in a further attempt to ‘renew’ the mechanisms of Kremlin control in Georgia. Unexpectedly, Saakashvili wrested power away from Shevardnadze’s lieutenants, and gradually fortified his position.”
What is the logical classification of this conclusion? Is it only “probable”? It seems to be stated as a fact but I can see no evidence supporting it. Should Nyquist have stated that it was proven Saakashvili was initially used but it was possible that he moved away from his mentor, I would have to reluctantly agree even though I would prefer to withhold judgment, to retain my cautious approach to all members of the demokratura (this is a brilliant phrase apparently invented by the Ukrainians to denounce the old soviet nomenklatura hiding under a thin coating of pseudo-democratic rhetoric and governing them under false pretences) but as things stand, I cannot see any reason for Nyquist’s acceptance of Saakashvili’s bona fides. At this point, please allow me a rather tedious digression.
A long standing debate was taking place in the Fifties amongst some members of the Western intelligence community on whether the soviet bloc should be treated as a monolith or would it be better to differentiate the approach to individual members of the bloc and thus create cracks in their unity. Was soviet leadership a collective acting in unison or was it just a field of never-ending feuds and power struggles? Shelepin was aware of these debates through his network of highly placed moles and quickly decided that by constantly providing proof of divisions he could strengthen the hand of those among Western leaders who, seeing a split with Tito, than with Albania, with China and Romania etc., argued that they were genuine and that the Western policies of discernment were working. The same was true about local parties, including cpsu, where there was supposed to be a perpetual struggle between the “conservatives” (that must rate as the most idiotic name ever invented to call orthodox communist “conservatives”!) and “liberals” or “reformist”. We saw the same pattern repeated over and over again ad nauseam in every country and yet, sovietologists swallowed it all and happily provided Western media with appropriate interpretations: support the liberals or things will go bad! Or (to borrow from Orwell’s sheep): Liberals good! Conservatives bad!
In reality, they were all playing as a team. Mackiewicz demonstrated it on numerous occasions. Golitsyn went one better by correctly predicting their next step on the basis of his methodology. Mackiewicz could not have read Anatoliy Golitsyn (he died in January 1985 after a long illness) but he was for many years faced with a strange spectacle of free people, Polish political émigrés, who were vociferous in their anticommunism and yet always supported one communist faction against the other. He was constantly amazed at the popularity garnered in the West by people such as Michnik or Sakharov, and was quite often accused by the same émigré circles for “attacking those who provide the only hope” or that a “verbal assault on them amounts to an assault on our cause”…
Michnik was the spiritus movens of the round table talks and, as the owner of Gazeta Wyborcza, a popular Warsaw daily, had a huge influence on the overall acceptance of the 1989 spectacle. Michnik had been persecuted, beaten up, arrested more times than anyone else – and still remained a commie (quite an achievement, really). Anyway, Mackiewicz faced with that unedifying spectacle concluded that it was a concerted attempt by soviet strategists to eradicate anticommunism. He could not identify the ultimate goals of the operation he was observing with growing alarm but I believe his criticisms proved inspired and the subsequent turn of events demonstrated who was really damaging the anticommunist cause.
Neither do I think that we are witnessing the last gasps of the Great Provocation. The genius of Shelepin’s plan lies in having many irons in the fire simultaneously; in having many contingency plans for many possibilities, hence my hypothesis of the “third echelon of soviet leaders” to perpetuate the fiction. In other words, I do not believe that the original plan conceived in the late Fifties contained anything like an intended fruition around year 2000 or the false revolutions in 1989-91. Andrei Navrozov described it somewhere as delicate, almost imperceptible, “cranking up of a plate” (I quote from memory), whereby things fall into place very slowly but surely. It will inevitably take time but the risk of speeding things up is far greater than of waiting.
I’ve read somewhere (but unfortunately can’t remember where) that when someone pointed out to the great James Jesus Angleton that he himself could have been a soviet mole, he replied that it was a possibility, which should not be discarded easily. The very nature of every successful deception is to sow confusion in the mind of the enemy. Angleton’s opponents within the CIA and the US Government criticised his methods for bringing paralysis to the American intelligence operations and, let’s face it, they were right. The paralysis, however, was the inevitable conclusion of an attempt at clearing the almighty mess that the US secret services were brought to by soviet penetration.
We find ourselves today in a similar situation – toutes proportions gardée – to the one Angleton faced. How do we avoid paralysis and defeatism without falling into a trap of accepting soviet dummies for reality? Should we model ourselves on Angleton and Mackiewicz and risk isolation, perhaps even paralysis? Or should we take lessons in hope and optimism? Mackiewicz and Angleton were very rarely wrong. It is actually quite astonishing to find out today, after 50-60 years, that some of Mackiewicz’s émigré opponents were on the payroll of the kgb… Silly me! Reading them, I thought they were just idiots.
I quite simply prefer to be much more cautious than Nyquist is. I do not believe that taking sides in internal power struggles happening within soviet reach has ever lead to anything good even when those struggles were real. In the case of Georgia and the Ukraine, however, they could very easily be just another disinformation campaign and then we will find ourselves with egg on our faces. Convincing Jeff Nyquist of the “authenticity of Saakashvili’s revolution” or that “what happened in Ukraine was a small step in a journey of a thousand miles” might already count as a small victory among the Moscow strategists just like acceptance of Gomułka amongst the émigrés did in 1956.