A Question of Discernment

Michael Bąkowski has explained, very briefly, his hypothesis of how the extended “Final Phase” of the Soviet long range strategy is carried forward in Eastern Europe by a “third echelon” of Soviet leaders: including such figures as Yushchenko, Saakashvili, and Putin. Because of the inevitable decrepitude of old politicians, like Yeltsin and Walesa, Bąkowski believes that the Kremlin was compelled to deploy new politicians, initiating a new round of deceptions. This was necessary because the long range strategy failed to break up NATO by detaching Germany in a timely fashion; so the “Final Phase” of the strategy went into overtime. The Liberal Facade Theater Company of the USSR was tasked with a series of encore performances. Further concessions had to be made to liberalism, capitalism, and to economic survival. Of course, there is danger in necessities of this kind. The former Warsaw Pact countries have joined NATO, and so have three former Soviet republics. If Moscow doesn’t like a political outcome in Eastern Europe, Russian tanks can no longer be called upon to intervene; and, on account of exit polling, electoral fraud carries risks (except in Russia, where the degree of control is maximal). The Soviet bloc has undergone structural changes. These changes were initiated in order to mislead and disarm the Western powers, gaining credits and technology, opening new lines of attack for the future. Napoleon once said that battles can be won by changing formation in the middle of the action. The advantage follows from the enemy’s inability to grasp the reason for the change, which is carried forward in an intentionally misleading way. The vulnerability of the army performing this “change of formation” is very real; but the enemy is taken by surprise, and misinterpreting what he sees, fails to adopt the right counter-strategy.  

Reviewing the twists and turns of the last twenty years, we should remember what Moscow’s long range strategy is all about. According to former KGB Major Anatoliy Golitsyn, in his February 1995 memorandum to the CIA, “The final objective of this strategy is Sino-Russian world domination….” Golitsyn further stated that the reason the “Russian strategists” selected Yeltsin to be President of Russia, was due to Yeltsin’s apparent renunciation of “Communism and [its] strategic purpose.” Here is the crux of the deception. The strategists in Moscow want to put the West to sleep. They want America to disarm and NATO to dissolve. One of the first things they did was disband the Warsaw Pact in hopes that NATO would disband. Sadly for them, this gambit did not work. This means that Moscow has been improvising without definitive success for nearly 20 years. The need to activate Mr. Bąkowski’s so-called “third echelon of leaders” merely proves that things have not gone according to Moscow’s plan. In short, Mr. Bąkowski is indirectly acknowledging my central point: that the Soviet long range plan has been forestalled by a series of complications.

“Everything in war is very simple,” wrote Carl von Clausewitz, “but the simplest thing is difficult.” In politics and war, there are many variables. These are not always within our power to calculate. That is why strategy is an art, and not a science. As Clausewitz explained, “In war more than anywhere else things do not turn out as we expect.” Men also misjudge situations because of the “fog of war.” Besides hope and fear, ambiguous information produces adverse “friction.” Clausewitz wrote that “every fault and exaggeration of theory is instantly exposed in war.” Therefore, it is worth repeating for the reader’s benefit: Moscow’s deception succeeded, but the strategy did not achieve its objectives. The United States did not immediately disarm. NATO did not fragment and collapse. As the 1990s went by, the particulars of limited freedom began to tear the vital fabric of Moscow’s controlling mechanisms. Russia had to be tightened. Therefore it was necessary to initiate a second war in Chechnya and bring in the regime of KGB officer Vladimir Putin. A retreat into nationalist forms became necessary. Golitsyn predicted this in his 1995 memorandum:

“In my letter of 12 October 1993 I referred to the military/nationalist option as the third course upon which the Kremlin strategists might embark in future to adjust the style and leadership of a new government if, for example, Yeltsin was considered to have exhausted his usefulness in extracting concessions from the West. In this context, the Chechnyan ‘crisis’ can be seen not as a likely cause of a military coup, but as a possible planned prelude to a change of government. The new government might be military or nationalist. Certain indications that this is envisaged, are apparent.” [The Perestroika Deception, p. 229]

Golitsyn thought the likelihood of a military/nationalist government might “prejudice the flow of Western aid and the continued ‘cooperation’ with the West which furthers the strategists’ interests….” For this reason, he suggested, “the Kremlin strategists will opt for a hybrid solution involving, for example, a new President and Commander-in-Chief with a military background and a ‘reformist’ Prime Minister, in the context of overtly tighter KGB control.” We find, in these words, yet another uncanny prediction by Golitsyn. Six years later Boris Yeltsin wrote in his memoirs, “I was waiting for a new general to appear, unlike any other. Or rather, a general who was like the generals I read about in books when I was young.” At long last, according to Yeltsin, “a general appeared. And soon after his arrival, it became obvious to our whole society how really courageous and highly professional our military people were. This ‘general’ was named Colonel Vladimir Putin.” [Midnight Diaries, p. 70] At Putin’s elbow was the fashionable liberal prime minister, Mikhail Mikhailovich Kasyanov. What Golitsyn called “the third course,” therefore, was the actual direction the “Russian strategists” took. The third course was necessary because the early hopes of the strategists were dashed by multiple failures, and the strategy had to be continued over a longer interval.

The strategists in Moscow are good planners. What they were attempting, on the scale they were attempting it, had never been tried before. They were quite confident regarding the deception, or they wouldn’t have gone ahead with it. They were uneasy about the ultimate effectiveness of the deception, however, as evidenced by their preparations. They saw weakness in Ukraine and Georgia; and so they took visible precautions. This may be seen in Moscow’s creation of special enclaves. In the case of Ukraine, the Trans-Dniester enclave is one of several links in a chain of encirclement. This chain includes Russia’s military union with Belarus in the north, Russia’s military position in Crimea to the south, and Moscow’s reinforced political holdings in the strategic port city of Odessa. Except for a small and vulnerable corridor leading into Poland, Ukraine’s national supply lines were blocked at the outset. This was by design, not by accident. A similar situation applies in Georgia, where Moscow’s military specialists and agents long ago created breakaway enclaves in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Here we see that the invasion routes into Georgia were thoughtfully secured, in advance, to facilitate a future invasion by Russian troops. There can be no doubt regarding the significance of Moscow’s preparations in Georgia and Ukraine. If Moscow spent precious resources developing these enclaves, then the Soviet strategists had doubts about Moscow’s agents in Kiev and Tbilisi. If this is so, then Mr. Bąkowski should also have doubts. For everything Mr. Bąkowski has written assumes that Moscow’s strategists know what they are doing. If they do not trust their own instruments in the two named countries, then Mr. Bąkowski should concede that genuine revolutions in Georgia or Ukraine are possible. In fact, Russia’s activation of the enclaves in Georgia, and the diplomatic recognition of those enclaves, suggests that Tbilisi’s independence is genuine; for Russia was holding these enclaves in reserve, as a countermeasure to genuine revolt. The triggering of these mechanisms, far from advancing the deception strategy, reveals the Russian Federation to be a threat to the whole of Europe. As a result of the Kremlin’s push into Georgia, the flow of Western money into Russia slowed. The Russian tanks were stopped because the Russian economy faced strangulation. The long range deception strategy was at a standstill.

The decisive argument for the authenticity of Saakashvili’s revolution in Georgia is found in the Russian military strike of August 2008: The Kremlin displayed its evil intentions and then was forced to abandon its military offensive by Western economic pressure. It is hard to imagine a more pathetic outcome, from a strategic point of view. The deception policy of 1989-91 was seriously damaged. There is nothing here, whatsoever, that could serve Moscow’s purpose. The West applied its economic weapon and forced Russia to retreat. If this is the work of a KGB agent sitting in Tbilisi, then the KGB has become as stupid as the CIA, and it’s strategy has become nonsense.

What has happened to the Kremlin’s strategy is simple. I call it the “Benedict Arnold factor.” As you probably know, Benedict Arnold was a general in the Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War. He treacherously changed sides in 1779, and his name became a byword for treason in the American lexicon. Historians of every period have noted the existence of traitors. Thucydides wrote of Alcibiades, an Athenian general who changed sides twice during the Peloponnesian War. Julius Caesar marched on Rome, proving himself to have been the most successful traitor in history. Acts of treason have continued up until modern times. Every political system, and every military force, has traitors living inside it. Entire armies have turned upon the state, provinces and colonies have rebelled, generals have changed sides. This is the way of history, the way of politics and war. The “Benedict Arnold factor” was understood perfectly by Josef Stalin, who took no chances whatsoever. His measures against treason may be described as “prophylactic.” He knew far better, and was much wiser, than the “blind kittens” who succeeded him and initiated the long range strategy. Stalin had a better sense of a deceiver’s limitations. Today’s Kremlin strategists have been forced by the initial failure of their strategy to rely on untested, third-rate material. It is probable, indeed, that Saakashvili was initially used by Georgian dictator Eduard Shevardnadze as a cast member in a further attempt to “renew” the mechanisms of Kremlin control in Georgia. Unexpectedly, Saakashvili wrested power away from Shevardnadze’s lieutenants, and gradually fortified his position.

As for the status of Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko, Mr. Bąkowski has conceded that “perhaps after all Nyquist is right….” Indeed, it would be difficult for him to argue that Yushchenko is Moscow’s loyal agent after they poisoned him. Better to retreat on this issue than appear ridiculous. With regard to the Yushchenko poisoning, a few comments are in order:  The primary suspect in the poisoning is Volodymyr Satsyuk, formerly the deputy head of the SBU (Ukrainian state security). Please note: Satsyuk fled to Russia and is now an advisor to the FSB Director. According to Oleh Lytvak, head of the Department on Law Enforcement for the Presidential Secretariat, “[Satsyuk] lives [in Russia] under another last name, not Satsyuk. Other suspects [in the case] are now advisors in different law enforcement agencies and the [Russian] Ministry of Interior.” Furthermore, the Kremlin refuses to give up the suspects, or allow them to be questioned. Therefore, nobody should be confused as to the relationship between Yushchenko and the Russian leaders. Russia is protecting the men who are suspected of poisoning the Ukrainian president. This is not a fake split, or a fake poisoning incident. When Satsyuk fled to Russia, the Ukrainian Interior Minister also fled to Russia. From this we can see that Russia had high-placed agents in the Ukrainian security system, and these agents were exposed.

To avoid misunderstanding, at no point do I think the Orange Revolution secured genuine independence for Ukraine. I am not confused as to the dominance of hidden or not-so-hidden KGB structures in the country. I refer to Boris Chykulay’s excellent report on the likely extent of the former KGB’s penetration of Ukraine’s political system. I write this so that Mr. Bąkowski will not misrepresent my position, suggesting I have proclaimed Yushchenko as the Second Coming, or that I refer to Ukraine as a genuinely independent country. What happened in Ukraine was a small step in a journey of a thousand miles; but the journey has begun. Yushchenko was elected, though his power has been cleverly and consistently undermined by the machinations of Ukraine’s parliament. He has used his position as head of state to promote remembrance of the Ukraine terror famine. He has therefore planted dragon’s teeth. Nothing could be more obnoxious to Moscow. Under Stalin, Yushchenko would have been struck down for marrying an American, let alone for flirting with Ukrainian nationalism. “Have you gone soft?” Stalin would say to his minions. “He fooled you.” And then, ominously: “Perhaps you wanted to be fooled.” (At these words the listener’s knees would go soft, and his bladder would weaken.)

So Mr. Bąkowski has retreated, and on more than one front. He now professes respect for Antoni Macierewicz. Until now, this respect has been demonstrated in an equivocal manner. He has publicly chastised Macierewicz’s participation in what Bąkowski calls a “fraudulent” political system, and for referring to the enemy strategists as “Russians.” I hate to mention this fact, but Anatoliy Golitsyn refers in his writings to “the collective leadership of the Russian strategists,” on page 223 of The Perestroika Deception. So if Macierewicz and Nyquist are guilty of this horrendous grammatical error, then I think we are in good company. Besides, it is wrong to reproach a man who has done so much with a fault so insignificant (if it is, indeed, a fault). In my view, Antoni Macierewicz is a hero who has unmasked enemy agents, performing a great service to his country. If our purpose is to frustrate a common enemy, then Macierewicz’s actions are more to the point than political grammar. As for the “fraudulence” of the Polish political system, we should remember that all political systems are permeated with fraud. Does that mean we should abandon them entirely to opportunists and criminals? It would be useful to know why Mr. Bąkowski thinks Macierewicz’s participation in politics legitimizes Communist dominance. If Macierewicz retired from politics would Moscow be happy or unhappy?

It is very human, but nonetheless egregious to use a simplistic formula to judge a complex event. When several nations apparently freed themselves from Communism in 1989 I never assumed anything without studying the relevant details. Suspecting that Golitsyn’s predictions would come to pass before the fact does not prove the revolutions were part of a Soviet long range plan. Genuine revolutions could occur even if fake revolutions were planned. It is only through the actual evidence that we find Golitsyn’s value as an interpreter and prognosticator. The proposition that “all revolutions against Moscow are arranged by Moscow” should not be our assumption, and it is not the basis of Golitsyn’s methodology. As a former Soviet citizen pointed out to me, the need for a controlled anti-communist movement is a measurement of the ever-present danger of genuine revolution. Ergo, the proposition that “all revolutions against Moscow are arranged by Moscow” is not valid insofar as it posits a universal rule from an incomplete set of particular instances. It is akin to the famous and erroneous proposition that “all swans are white.” In the case of “all revolutions against Moscow” we already know that genuine revolutions (i.e., black swans) have already been sighted. Consider the 1956 uprising in Hungary. Perhaps you will modify your thesis to say “all revolutions against Moscow after 1984 are arranged by Moscow.” But this formulation assumes that all future revolutions will be under Moscow’s control, which is something we cannot possibly know! On what grounds – factual or reasonable – can we make such an assertion? The formula takes for granted the permanent effectiveness of Moscow’s control system, the steady reliability of Moscow’s agents, and the invincibility of Moscow’s hidden KGB structures (which Bąkowski denies are hidden, perhaps because his perspicacity extends to things the rest of us cannot easily see). Mr. Bąkowski draws his conclusions based on guilt by association: Yushchenko and Saakashvili participated in the Soviet system, were elevated to prominence by “former” Soviet apparatchiks, and were trusted functionaries within this context. The same could be said of Jan Sejna and Ion Pacepa, high-level Soviet bloc defectors. From such men we have gained the deepest insights into the Soviet system. Believe me, Mr. Bąkowski, there are many Sejnas and Pacepas at work in the former Soviet countries. Some have already turned against the system. Others will turn in the future.

The appearance of every object depends to some extent on our distance from the object. The further away we are the fewer details stand out. An attractive female shape in the distance may, in fact, be a homosexual man. The visual details required for a proper identification may demand a closer vantage point. The same must be said about Mr. Bąkowski’s depiction of Yushchenko and Saakashvili. The first details that come to our attention are damning, and suggest the conclusion that these men are agent provocateurs. In reality, of course, we know next to nothing about the men themselves. Further details, however, call our preliminary conclusions into question.

In matters of strategy, concepts must be grounded in practical experience. Strategic ideas are not deductive propositions, such as (1) all men are mortal; (2) Socrates is a man (c) therefore Socrates is mortal. Strategic ideas are blueprints for action or counteraction against an opponent, such as (1) Soviet methods include controlled dissident movements; (2) controlled dissidents movements may be used to generate fake anti-communist revolutions (c) therefore revolutions against communism may be contrived and deceptive. This is a far cry from saying “all revolutions against communism are arranged by Moscow.” Our evaluation of any particular revolution must depend on the facts of the case. Whether a revolution against communism is authentic or contrived is a matter for expert determination. We should not automatically assume it is contrived, as in: (1) Moscow has infiltrated every opposing formation; (2) those who oppose Moscow are merely tools of Moscow (c) therefore, resistance to Moscow is futile. This approach is defeatist, and therefore blameworthy. It does not reflect what actually happens when strategies – even good ones – are put into effect.

It is lamentable that our discourse, so far, has failed to inspire a promising counterstrategy. It is even more lamentable that we have apparently embraced  defeatism. Such should no longer be tolerated, and must be put down. The enemy’s lies have an expiration date. Their purpose envisions a reversion to “one clenched fist.” The deception disarms and divides the West, while the East rearms and unites. This was clearly stated by Golitsyn, and is seen today in Moscow and Beijing’s armament policies. We are headed, therefore, toward a critical passage from a situation in which the world is deceived to a situation in which the world is undeceived. As we approach this passage there occurs an increase in “friction.” As it is a political war, the words of Clausewitz are applicable: “…a general in time of war is constantly bombarded by reports both true and false; by errors from fear or negligence or hastiness; by disobedience born of right or wrong interpretations, of ill will, of a proper or mistaken sense of duty, of laziness, or of exhaustion; and by accidents that nobody could have foreseen.”

We are at war. And there is no escape from this war. We look at the tumult of politics, at the confusing list of political actors and causes, and we are inclined interpret things favorably or unfavorably. We are either optimistic or pessimistic. In a dangerous struggle such as this, balance is required; and so I give my American friends a dose of black pessimism while offering Mr. Bąkowski “a spoonful of anticommunist honey.” The chief fault of the American is unwarranted optimism. The chief fault of Mr. Bąkowski is unwarranted pessimism. The American must be taught to expect the worst while Mr. Bąkowski must be taught to hope for the best. It is my view that Mr. Bąkowski needs a sweetener. Of course, we wouldn’t want him too sweetened. Someone might mistake him for a pineapple.

Michael Bąkowski says that we should “not allow common usage to dictate the terms of our discourse.” But common usage already dictates the terms; and we are not superheroes who can obliterate given names or accepted terminology at a single blow. The significance of common usage lies in the necessities of mutual regard and courtesy. When your thinking goes against the received ideas of the day, when your facts are unknown and your analysis discounted by nearly everyone, respect for others is the portal through which to win respect for yourself. The best way to be heard is to listen. The people who disagree with us are not idiots. Why should we treat them like idiots, correcting their grammar, terminology and words? If we want to improve our own thinking, we should take the thinking of others into account. If we do not converse with those who see the world differently, then ours is not a discourse but an offstage soliloquy; a lunatic babbling to himself.

We respect others so we may be respected in turn. By observing the reactions of others, we see the off-putting effect of idiosyncratic language. We see how people are likely to turn away from outdated terms, unverified facts, and unconventional thinking; that is, unless the approach is respectful and imbued with an attitude of humility that eschews the cocksure. Why should we forfeit sympathy that we might otherwise win? What are we doing, after all? Asserting our omniscience? It is better to recognize the power of the person who disagrees with our position, and engage in a dialogue that tests our understanding as it tests the understanding of others.